Ius
ius stammt ursprünglich aus dem lateinischen Verb ‚iuare‘ und bedeutet ‚schwören‘, ‚aufrichtig sein‘, ‚sich anderen einordnen‘[1]. Van Dun[2] setzt ‚ius‘ in Kontrast zu ‚lex‘: “Der Begriff ‚lex‘ bezieht sich auf das Lateinische Verb ‚legere‘ (sammeln; auswählen; zusammen nehmen). Es bezeichnet eine Beziehung in der eine Person eine Position inne hat, die sie dazu ermächtigt andere auszusuchen oder aufzusammeln, damit sie tun was sie befiehlt. Ihre ursprüngliche Bedeutung war die Handlung der ‚Einberufung‘ von Männern zu den Waffen oder sich zum militärischen Dienst zu melden. ‚Lex‘ ist verwandt mit ‚dilectus‘, [militärische] Mobilisation — vgl. die römischen ‚Legionen'. Später wurde ‚lex' benutzt, um jegliches allgemeine Kommando zu bezeichnen, das durch eine politisch organisierte Gesellschaft vorgesehen wurde - eine die fähig ist, Gehorsam zu den Befehlen der militärischen Gewalt durchzusetzen.”
Im Gegensatz zu ‚lex‘ reflektiert ‚ius‘ eine völlig andere Auffassung von dem, was Recht sein soll. ‚Ius‘ ist bei den Römern immer an die (Streit)Sache (lat.: rem) gebunden. Es ist genau genommen eine sachliche, philosophische, logisch-ethische Sicht.
- ↑ Frank van Dun, "Concepts of Order", Journal des economistes et des études humaines, 6.4(1996):555-79: "We may well ask how this extremely physical concept of right-as-might can be connected with justice. As we use the words right, recht, droit, diritto now, the original meaning has almost completely vanished. The focus has shifted to the concept corresponding to the Latin ius. In its original meaning ius (plural: iura) stood for “a bond” or “a connection,” but with little or no physical connota-tions. A ius originates in solemn speech (iurare, to swear, to speak in a manner that reveals commitment and obligation). As such a ius is a logical or rational, i.e., a symbolic, hence social or moral bond. When the speech is reciprocal, the result is an agreement or contract among equals, an association. Ius connotes commitment and obligation, but also equality in the sense of likeness. By speaking to another, and waiting for his answer, by committing oneself towards him and waiting for him to commit himself, one treats him as one’s like. It should be clear, that a ius implies, that the persons involved are mutually independent speakers. If one of them is a right, or within the right, of the other, there is presumably no ius between them. This presumption may be defeasible, but it cannot be dismissed out of hand, since one person’s speech acts may also be controlled by the other, if the former is under the control of the latter. A ius, in short, stands in stark contrast to right-as-might. It creates no physical bond (or yoke) that serves to control or govern another as if he were an animal to be tamed and steered. Instead it creates a bond of an entirely different kind, a covenant that respects his likeness and leaves his freedom intact. The common idea of a bond links the notions of ius and right-as-might, but the different natures of the bonds, logical in the one case, physical in the other, are too obvious to ignore. Even if we disregard the aspect of physical force and violence in the practice of ruling (regnum), we should not overlook the difference between speech by which one obligates oneself (swearing, promising) and speech by which one obliges others (commanding)."
- ↑ Frank van Dun, "Concepts of Order", Journal des economistes et des études humaines, 6.4(1996):555-79:: “The term 'lex' refers to the Latin verb ‚'legere' (to choose; to pick). It denotes a relationship in which a person holds a position that entitles him to choose or pick others to do what he commands them to do. Its original meaning was the act of calling men to arms or to report for military duty. ‚'Lex' is related to ‚'dilectus', [military] mobilization—cf. the Roman ‚'legions'. Later, ‚'lex' came to denote any general command issued by a politically organized society, one that is capable of enforcing obedience to its commands by military force.”)
